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search model, Bar-Ilan and Levy study the effect  for better jobs.
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Figures  271.  INTRODUCTION
The objective of this paper is to study within a general equilibrium framework the economic
implications  of institutional  frivions to labor mobility.  It thus extends  theoretical  analyses  of this problem,
such as Lazear (1990), done in a less detailed setup.
The equilibrium  framework  which is the basis  to the model  we introduce  was  developed  by Albrecht
and Axell (1984) and used by Eckstein and Wolpin (1990). The novelty of Albrecht and Axell is
endogenous  determination  of nondegenerate  wage offer distribution  in a general equilibrium  model. Since
search on the job is not allowed, there a.-e  two wage levels in equilibrium. The lower wage should be
high enough to induce  the workers to accept this wage offer and lose for good the option  to work at the
higher wage finns.
We extend this model by perintting the individual to continue the search while working. This
endogenizes  the extent of the restrictions  on search. In equilibrium  some firms will choose to offer high
wages in return for a commitment  of their workers not to search for better jobs. Other firms, which
cannot afford to pay the wage that guarantees lifetime attachment, pay lower wages, but impose no
restrictions on search on-the-job. This characterizes  two forms of labor contracts, shoit and long-term
contracts, which coexist in equilibrium,  and a wage offer distribution  which amounts  to three wage levels.
It is demonstrated that observed limitations on mobility of workers might be the outcome of
voluntary arrangements evolved endogenously.  We then proceed to study the employment effects of
exogenous  restrictions  on mobility.  These restrictions  take the form of a transfer  from the quitting worker
made either to the employer or to a third party.
Restrictions of the latter type, by crowding out the firms which allow search on-the-job, have a
direct effect of increasing  unemployment.  In addition, the mechanism  underlying  the general equilibrium
model introduces negative externality on the existing firms, and reduces the proportion of the firms
paying the highest wage. This increases  unemployment  further, not only among those who are directly
involved in search  on-the-job, but among other groups of workers  as well.-2-
On the other hand, there is a range of sizes of transfer made to the firm, in which the transfer has
no real effect on the economy. In this region, similar to Lazear (1990), any exogenous intervention  is
neutralized  by endogenous  arrangements  developed  in the economy.  However, this offsetting  mechanism
works only up to a certain exogenous transfer. Above this limit, general equilibrium forces ruin the
feasibility of neutralizing arrangements. In this case unemployment increases up to  the level that
corresponds  to Eckstein  and Wolpin's (1990) version of Albrecht  and Axell (1984), where any mobility
of workers is blocked.
The structure of this paper is as follows. Sections  2 to 4 analyze  the equilibrium  assuming  that the
transfer goes to a third party. Section  2 derives  the terms of labor  contracts which emerge in equilibrium,
while  section 3 presents the labor supply functions  implied  by these contracts. The equiliorium  outcome
is determined in section  4. Section 5 studies the nature of the equilibrium  when the transfer is assumed
to go to the employer, while economic implications  of exogenous  restrictions  on mobility are analyzed
in section 6.  Section 7 deals with the related question of the employment  effects of unemployment
compensation.
2.  DETERMINATION  OF LABOR  CONTRACTS
Employment  contracts in our model specify the wage, w;, and a separation bond Bi, posted by
workers in firms offering  contract i and is forfeited in the event that they move  to another firm. We first
consider the case in which the forfeited bond goes to a third party.' In each period an individual is
allowed  to search for a job. Both seurch on and off-the-job  are allowed. Individuals  searching for a job
'raw at random  from a wage distribution  which, in equilibrium,  is deter -iined  endogenously.
'The  forfeited bond is added to the e defined below.  For instance, it goes to a global fund which is
distributed  among  all individuals. Discussion  of employee's  bonds  can be found in Dickens  et. al. (1989)
and Bar-Ilan (1991).The search strategy is optimal, in the sense that it maximizes  the individual's  lifetime utility. The
per-period utility is additive in consumption, c, and leisure, m,  such that u  =  c  +  vm, where the
consum.:tion  good c is the numeraire. 2 There are two types of workers  that differ in their imputed value,
v, of leisure. We denote the two types by vo and v, where vo <  v,. The fraction of the vo  individuals  is
,B.  In all other respects, including  market productivitv,  all worker  are identical.
The per-period utility  of a working individual  with leisure m = 0 is w + e, where e is the income
paid irrespective  of market activity An unemployed  (m= 1) v 1 individual  derives a utility of v, +  b +
e where b) represents  unemployment  compensation.
We show below that there are three different labor contracts in %quilibrium:
wO  =  vo +  b  Bo = 0  (la)
W,  =O  +  +  y 2 (1l)  (vl-v 0)  B  _____VI__o_(lb
w  =  vO+  b  +1  _  ( 1-72  )(1-T  )  1  (1-72  )(1-7)Tlb
w2= v, +  b  B2  -0  (Ic)
where x is the probability  that the individual  will not survive to the next period and -y2  is the fraction of
frms offering the highest  wage, w2. An individual  will draw a wage offer w, with probability yi, where
(yo +  -yi  +  a2) is the wage offer probability  and p =  1 - (,yo  +  ay + -y 2) is the probability  of not getting
a wage offer.
For the wage distribution (w,, -,') to be an equilibrium,  the highest wage, w2, should be the p
reservation  wage of the v, individual, i.e. (v, + b). The wage w 2 will not be larger than (v, +  b) since
a higher wage does not increase the labor supply, but increases  wage expenditures,  and therefore must
2 The notation in this section follr  " closely that of Albrecht  and Axell (1984).-4  -
reduce profits. Similarly, w 2 <  (VI  + b) will not attract any v 1 individual. The bond B 2 can take any
nonnegative  value, since i: does not enter the profit function  of the firms, and a worker with wage w2 will
never quit. Thus w2 =  v, +  b: B 2 >  0, as in (1c).
Any wage below w2 can attract workers of type vo only. We show below that for this case, two
types of contracts  exist in equilibrium.  The first is a lifetime  contract  in which the frm offers high wages
and the worker makes a commitment  not to quit, i.e. there exists a "reversed  tenure," given to the firm
by its employees  in remrn for a wage premium. The second type of labor contract  is a short term contract
in which the worker is allowed  to sea;ch on-the-job  and quit in case he finds a better job. In equilibrium
a worker is indifferent  between  the two types of labor contracts.
When a vo individual  rejects a wage w  <  wv 2 offered to him in order to search for a w 2 job, then
his lifetime expected  utility V* is:
V*  =VO +  +  (1-T)  [  2 °  Y  (1-Y 2 )  V*].  (2)
When the vo  worker accepts  the w job offer and continues  searching  on-the-job  for the w 2 contract,  then
his expected  lifetime utility is: 3
V*  = w  + 6  + (1T  )[  (W2  BY2  +  (1  2  )  V*  (3)
3 Implicit  in equation  (3) is the assumption  of a costless  search, whether  the worker is employed  or not.
A possible extension  is to allow for a non-symmetric  search cost, where it is more costly  to search while
working.-5  -
where B Z 0 is the separation  bond posted by the worker when he accepts the w cuntract  and is forfeited
when he quits and accepts the w 2 offer. If the workc- accepts and keeps the w job for life, then:
V*  =  _+  (4)
In equilibrium  the worker should be indifferent  between the three alternatives.  This is equivalent  to the
reservation wage property which states that wage offers are d_;termined  suc;  that individuals are
indifferent  to whether  accepting  or rejecting  them. Equating  V* from equations  (2) and (4), together with
equation (lc), gives the wage of the lifetime contract, w,, as:
wl  'v  + b +  72-  ( 1 -T )  (V2i  T)  *  (5) 0  1 -(1- 2)  T1-r
Equating V* from equations  (2) and (3) yields:
w =  VO  +  b  +  (1-T)'y 2B.  (6)
Equation  (6) represents  all the labor contracts  (w,B)  which keep the worker indifferent  between  accepting
and rejecting  a contract  which allows  search on-the-job.  When the separation  bond increases,  for a given
-y2, the worker must be compensated  by a higher wage. Since w, but not B, enters the profit function  of
1ims, the profit maximizing  labor contract is zero separation  bond and the lowest  possible wage, that is:
Wo  =  vo + b;  Bo = 0 . (7)-6  -
We have found in equation (5) the lowest wage w, which can induce  a lifetime commitment  on the part
of the cnmrloyees.  The separation bond supporting  this commitment,  B 1, must not be smaller than the
value given by equation (6) after substitutio!n  of w,, that is:
1- -2)  ( 1 - (8)
We have thus identified  the possibility of the existence  of three different labor contracts. The (w2,B)
contract offers a wage which is high enough to attract and keep all types of workers, since it clearly
dominates  all other contracts from the workers' point of view. The other contracts, (wo,  BO)  anid  (w,, B,),
are equivalent for the employees  since the expected lifetime utility derived from both contracts is the
same. The (w,, B,) is a lifetime contract in which the worker agrees, for a wage premium, to keep the
same  job for as long as he lives. On 'he other hand, the wage wo  is low and equals the pure reservation
wage of the vo  worker, but he or she can move to a job that yields a higher expected  ..fetime utility. Any
wage w, wo <  w  <  w,, will not be supported in equilibrium  since, with this wage, the only possible
contract is a short-term  one; given  that, the firm would  rather offer a wage wO.  Since in this case the cost
of search is the same when employed  or not, the worker is willing  to accept  a job that compensates  for
the value of foregone leisure and then continues  to search.
3.  DETERMINATION  OF LABOR  SUPPLY
Firms set the wage rate in order to maximize  profits. A higher  wage may increase  the labor supply
to a firm for three reasons. First, as in Albrecht  and Axell (1984), a high enough  wage might induce the
v, individuals, who value leisure highly, to accept a wage offer instead of rejecting it and staying at
home. Second, a high wage can induce  workers to implicitly  sign a lifetime  contract with the firm; and-7  -
third, a higher wage may induce vo workers who search on the job  Lo accept more lucrative labor
contract.
Firms are heterogenous  with linear production  teclmology,  as in Albrecht  and Axell. The output  per
worker, X,  is constant  for each firm and is distributed  across arms with a cumulative  distribution  function
A(h), where the paramneter  X takes values or. (0,1].' 1he p.ofit 7r(w;X)  of a flrm with productivity A
which offers a wage w is (X-w)f(w),  where 2(w) is the labor supply, which, in c ir model, is identical
to the employment  level.
In equilibrium  firms will be aistributtd either as in figure 1 or as in figure 2. The curve 7r(wi;  X)
cuts the horizontal  axis at the point X = w 1, and its constant  slope is 2(w 3). Since wo <  w, <  W2  and as
we show below 2(wo)  <  e(w,) <  2(w 2), 1r:w 1; X), i  0  O, 1, 2, are as depicted  in figures 1 and 2. The
situation depicted  in figure 1 presents four groups of firms. Tne least productive firms, when X  satisfies
0  s  X <  wo, cannot afford to pay the lowest wage rate wo, the pure reservation wage of the vo
individuals. These firms would be inactive, and their fraction in the population, denoted by p, is p  =
A(wo).  A second group of firms offers the wage rate wo,  but does not restrict the search  of its employees
for a better job. The fraction of firms in this group, -yo,  is yo  = A(Xo*)  - A(wo),  where XO*  is defined  by
7r(wo;  Ao*)  = 7r(w 1; No*).  The third group of firms offer vo  individuals  a premium  for a lift-time contract
in the form of a wage w, >  wo.  The fraction of firms in this group is 71  = A(X 1*) - A(XO*)  where XI*
is defined by ir(wl; XA*)  =  7r(w 2; XI*).  Finally, the most productive  finns offer the highest  wage w2, ard
the fraction 72 of firms in this group is 72  =  1 - A(XI*).
In the equilibrium  described  in figure 2 there are two types of active  firms. In this case the "loyalty"
wage premium is so high such that the (w 1,B 1) contrar, is not a profit maximizing  policy for any firm.
This situation happens when XA*  S  k*,  whereas when X,* >  XO*  there will be three types of active
4 The structure of the supply side bears some simnilarity  to that of Lucas and Prescott (1974).-8  -
finrs  in equilibrium. In the equilibrium  of figure  2 we have yo  =  A(X 2*) - A(wo),  ,y  = 0, a-.d 72  1
- A(X 2*), where X2*  is defined by w(wo;  X 2*) =  r(w 2; X2*).
We now turn to the derivation  of the labor supply and the unemployment  rate. In each period there
are k individuals  and n (active  and inactive)  firms in the economy. The constant  probability  of death per
period is T, and therefore Tk  individuals  are born and die in every period.
Denote the rct.o of individuals  to firms, k/n, by A . The number of individuals  who accept a job
within a wo  firm in each period is
T.43[I  +  p(1_7)  +  p2(1-_) 2 +  T,  ]  =  _  T/L
1p  ( 1-  T
The first term is the number of vo individuals  per firm entering the economy. The -ccond expression
denotes  vo  surviving individuals  who searched  unsuccessfully  in the previous  period, and so on. The labor
supply e(wo)  is therefore:
e  (w  )  =  1  TX  (+1 *  (1  -T)  (1  -2  )  +  (  T1  -)2  (1  2 ) 2 +  )  (9)
-p (1
e  (wo  ) =  T  (10)
The second term in equation (9) denotes the surviving individuals  who accepted a wo  job offer in the
previous period and did not get a w 2 offer currently, and so on.
The number of acceptances  per period  for wo  and w. firms is identical.  The attrition  rate of workers
in w, firms is, however, a result  of death only, since the implicit  contract  of w, firms is lifetime contract.
Hence f(wl) is:-9  -
(w 1)  1  -p( _T  )  [1  +  (1  1-T)  +(1-T  )2  +4  ]  _  L  (11)
Individuals  of type v, accept  jobs only within firms which offer a w 2 wage. The number of acceptances
per period of v, individuals  is
4L(1_-0)[1  +  (1-_)(l-y2)  +  (1-r)2(l-y2)2 +  ]=  - (  T  (1  -/?)
Again, the first term denotes  newborn v, individuals, the second expression those who searched
unsuccessfully  in the previous period, and so on. Since  workers in w 2 firms stay in their firm as long as
they are alive, the labor supply of y, individuals  to each w 2 firm is
p1  (1-,B  )
1  lT  )  (  -y2  )
In addition, each vo individual  who is offered wage w2 as his first  job offer, accepts this offer and
never quits. This is identical to the labor supply to w, firms, 2(w 1). Moreover, vo individuals  working
in wo  firms search on the job for w 2 jobs. For any wo  firm, the number  of workers  moving to w 2 firms
in each period is e(wo)(l-r)'y 2. Multiply  this by yo/'y2  to get 1(wo)(I-r)yo  as the number  of workers  moving
from wo  firns  to each w 2 firm in any period. Since these workers are also loyal to their new firm, the
extra supply of labor via this channel  is 1(wO)(1-r)-yO/d.  Summing  the three sources of labor supply to w 2
firms, we have
1  - ( 1-  T )  ( 1  -T  )  -(WI)  +  (  T1-  )  2(W 0)  (12) where(1(w-)T)  (1 -wY 2 )  T
where t(w2)  f (wl) >  2(w 0).- 10-
In order to derive the unemployment rate, notice that in every period there are 'k(1-(3)(1-y)
individuals  of type v 1 who search for the first time, Tk(l-_)(1_y 2)2(1-_) who search for the second time,
and so on. Total number of v, individuals  searching  while unemployed  is:
Tk(l-3)(l-y2)(l+(1  -'y 2 )(1-T) +  (l,y2)2(1-_) 2 +  Tk  =  1  (1-a)  (1-7 2 )
The expression  for vo  individuals  is similar, with the obvious replacement  of (1-,)  by ,3 and (1-ay2)  by p.
The total number of unemployed  vo individuals  is therefore Tk0p/[l-p(1-r)J. The unemployment  rate S
is
S  =  T,p  +  T(  1-93)  (1-7 2 )  (13) 1 -p  (1-  T)  1-7(1- 2 )  (1  -T)
The unemployment  rate among  vo individuals,  SO,  is
so Tp  ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~(14)
1 -p  ( 1-  ) 
while SI, the unemployment  rate among v, workers, is:
SI  T1  (  1  i-T 2 )(  )  (15)
Since p =  1 - (-yO  +  Xy +  y2) <  1 - 72,  we have SO  < SI.4.  EQUILIBRIUM  WAGE DISTRIBUTION
Up until now we have established  the existence  of three types of labor contracts and the associated
labor supply. We now turn to the endogenous  derivation  of the fraction of firms offering each contract,
which completes  the detennination  of the equilibrium  in the economy.
Recall that the cutoff productivity  X4  is defmed by ir(w 0;  )  =  ir(wl;  X), or
0 = w  (w 1-w)(w 0 )  (16)
Similarly, we have
(w2-W)  e(W)
XIt =  (W2  +  I  (w)  e (wI)  (17)
X2 =2  +  (W2  )-  Wel  (WO  )  (l8)
1' (W)  - f  (WO)
Substituting  the labor supply functions  yields
X0 = v, + b . (19)
;=v 1 +b+  +  ( 1-a  )  [1-p(1-)  >  (20)
Since V  >  X4 for all parameter values, there cannot be two wage levels in equilibrium,  and the cutoff
productivity  X4  and figure 2 are irrelevant. This can be summarized  as a proposition:- 12 -
PROPOSITION  1: There are dtree possible  types of equilibria  in the economy.  When v 0 + b >  1, there
will be no active firms; when v0 + b s  1 and XI >  1, the only labor contract offers a wage w0 = v.
+ b; when X, ￿  1, all three labor contracts  described in equation (1) will coexist.
When v0 + b >  1 the participation  rate in the whole labor market is zero. The case XI'  >  1 means
that there is no firm which finds it optimal to offer a wage which is high enough to induce the v,
individuals  to work. In this case one group of individuals  will never participate  in the job market. Since
this degenerate  situation is not very interesting,  we focus from now on (in the case where V, s  1. Notice
also that both X; and XI are functions  of exogenous  parameters only. This is because p  =  A(wo)  =
A(vO+b)  and 'yo  = AQ)  - A(wo)  = A(v,+b) - A(vo  + b).
Our model shares some common  predictions  with other studies which allow  search on the  job, such
as Burdett (1978)  and Mortensen  (1986). In particular, we provide  a general enuilibrium  explanation  for
the observed negative  association  between  the propensity  to separate from a job and the wage earned, a
result found also by Burdett  using a partial equilibrium  model. The mechanism  underlying  this result is,
however, somewhat  different. In Burdett  (1978) workers  have a weaker  incentive  to quit when the wage
is higher, since the payoff for additional search is lower, given exogenous wage distribution. In our
model, employees  of w 2 firms do not quit for a similar reason, since the probability  of finding a higher
paying  job is zero. In addition, a unique feature of our model is the fact that the intermediate  wage, w,,
is voluntarily conditional upon not quitting. The highest wage, w2,  is therefore not attractive to w,
workers since it should be discounted  by the value of their separation  bond, B,. Quitting in our model
occurs from the lowest wage firms only, which implies the negative relation  between quit rate and the
wage earned. 5
5 A related, but different result is derived by Burdett and Mortensen (1980) which show that wage
differentials  reflect the compensation  required for a difference  in layoff  probabilities. In our model the
duration of time in the job increases with the wage, since it reflects commitment  on the part of the
employees, not layoffs.- 13 -
Another prediction made here is a  positively sloped wage-experience  profiles 6 for part of the
population, that is, v0 individuals  who start at a low wage w 0 and eventually  find a higher-paying  job w2.
This provides an alternative  explanation  to the standard argument of accumulated  human capital while
employed, which can also generate  the upward sloping earnings  profile.
Our model has also the flavor of combining implicit contracts and search, as in Burdett and
Mortensen (1980) and  Mortensen (1986). There is  a  tendency in  our  labor market to  generate
employee-employer  relationships  that can last for some time, and appeal to some segments  of the work
force.
5.  BOND GOES TO THE EMPTLOYER
We now study  the equilibrium  when  the assumption  that the forfeited  separation  bond goes to a third
party is replaced by the assumption  that the bond goes to the employer. To that end, the following
proposition  can be stated:
PROPOSITION  2: The resulting equilibrium does not change when the separation bond goes to the
employer and not to a third party. The only difference  might occur for the nominal terms of the (w 0, BO)
labor contract.
PROOF: The assumption  that the bond goes to the employer might make a difference  for firms offering
the w0 wage, since these firms can now collect  the Bo  bond  of their quitting  employees.  Since  a separation
bond Bo >  0 requires a higher wage w0, given by equation (6), in order to induce workers to take the
(w0, BO)  contract rather than continue  searching, equation (la) should be replaced  by (la'):
6 A similar result was found also by Burdett  (1978).- 14 -
WO  = vO  + b + (1-r) -2 Bo  1-  (  - o  )(1-T)>Bo  > °  (la')
Any  combination  (wo,  BO)  satisfying  (la') yields  the same  lifetime  expected  utility  V*, given, for instance,
by equation  (2). Similarly, the profit lr(wo;  X)  is the same for all (wo,  BO)  contracts  of equation  (Ia').  This
is obvious since (1-T)y 2f(wo) workers move to w2 firms from any wo  firm in each period, and we have:
7r(wo;X)  =  (X - wo)f(wo) +  (1 - r)-y 21(wO)BO  =  (X - vo - b)f(wo).
Clearly, changing  the assumption  about the party collecting  the bond does not have an impact on w, and
w 2 firms, whose workers never quit. Hence  the equilibrium  depicted in figure I does not change. The
distribution  of firms, labor supply  and all equations  derived in the previous sections  still hold, except for
equation (la).  Notice that when Bo attains or exceeds its upper bound (v1-vO)/[l-(l-y 2)(1-r)] of (la'),
workers will never quit since they are better off at the wo  firm rather than accepting  a w7  job offer and
paying the separation bond B.. In this case the (w 0, BO)  labor contract becomes a  lifetime contract,
yielding a lower profit than (X-vo-b)f(wo)  to the firm. Hence Bo  must be lower than its upper bound in
equation (la').
We have thus come to the apparently  surprising conclusion  that whether the bond goes to a third
party or to the employer does not make any real difference. The conventional  wisdom is that payments
made to a third party are necessariDy  distorting.  What we see here is that in a general equilibrium  context,
and when the bond is determined  endogenously,  the same  equilibrium  is attained  irrespective  of the nature
of the bond. When the bond is assumed to go to a third party, workers and firms circumvent this
constraint by writing  contracts in which either the bond is zero, as in (la), or the bond is never paid, as
in (lb) and (1c). When the bond goes to the firm, both sides can agree upon a menu (wo,  BO)  of wages- 15 -
and bonds, given by equation (la'),  which is neutral in its effect on workers and firms. We can now
proceed  to the determination  of the equilibrium  when  the separation  bond is not determined  endogenously,
but is rather enforced  exogenously  by some institutional  or other arrangement.
6.  RESTRICTED  SEARCH AND UNEMPLOYMENT
Lazear (1990)  presents the theoretical  arguments  for and against  job security provisions  at the firm
level. He concludes  that "It is also true that severance  pay effects are neutral only when payment made
by the firm is received by the worker. There can be no third-party intermediary  receiving any of the
payment. If this occurs, then incentives  are necessarily  distorted." (Lazear, 1990, p.702).
Lazear's conclusion that severance pay made by the employer to the employee is neutral with
respect to its effect on employment,  is based upon the ability to contract around this constraint, in the
form of the worker "buys" his job from the firm. If this is not possible, then any kind of severance pay
is distortionary, as in Gavin (1986).
We study here the possible distortionary  effects of separation bonds. Since whether  the firm has to
pay the worker when they split or vice versa should not make any difference, severance pay and
separation bonds being analogous. We can therefore extend the analysis of exogenous restrictions on
separation of workers and firms to a general equilibrium framework. In particular, we would like to
understand whether the  market generates ways to  offset these restrictions, such  that  there  are
circumstances  in which the imposition  of restrictions on separation does not have any real effect, as
obtained  by Lazear (1990) in a partial equilibrium  framework.
6.1.  Bond Goes to a Third Party
Assume initially  that a prohibitively  large separation bond, going to a third party when forfeited,
is exogenously  imposed.  Clearly, there is some bond B* (calculated  below) such that for any bond B, B
2  B*, all separation is blocked. In this case, our model reduces  to that of Eckstein  and Wolpin (1990),- 16-
which is a version of Albrecht and Axell (1984) when individuals  can draw job offers from active or
inactive firms, i.e., p  >  0. In this case there are no firms which pay the low wage wo. Instead, the
lowest wage possible is w,, which compenstes  the workers for the lost option to work at the high wage
w 2.
It is straightforward  to show, either directly or using Eckstein and Wolpin, that with no search
on-the-job  the labor supply is
- (l)  =  A 0(21) 1  1 - p ( 1--TT)(1
2 ( W2  )  (  )  -(1.3)  (  - T )  (22)
where the expressions for  01  ,  B  and w2 are given in equation (1), and a  "hat" denotes the
restricted separation model. Notice that w 2,  but not w,, is numerically identical in the two models,
because  2  *  72.  The fraction of firms paying  w1  and w 2 is:
=  =A(.2)  -A(  w)  (23)
2 =1-A(9;)  (24)
and  f;  =A  (  1)  is the probability  of not drawing a job offer from an active firm in a given period.
The cutoff productivity  2;  that distinguishes  between  wl  and w2  firms is:- 17  -
(1-()  [ 1 -(31-T)T  (25)
The expressions for the unemployment  rate in the whole population, §,  and among vo and v,
individuals, SO and  §1,  respectively, are the same as  in  equations (13), (14), and  (15).  The
unemployment  rate increases with p  and decreases with  2  2 . Since p  =  A(wo) <  p  =  A (f).
and y2 >  1 2 (since Xi < A  ), then SO  <  SO  and St <  21  where So  and S, correspond  to zero
exogenous bond, as in sections (2)-(4). That is, relative to the unconstrained  search unemployment,
imposing  binding separation bonds increase unemployment  for both groups of individuals.
Assume now that the exogenous  separation bond B satisfies  0  s  B <  B.  For these values of B
there are three wage levels  in equilibrium,  and the model  is basically  the one presented  in sections  (2)-(4),
with the following  changes. The wage wo  and the bond Bo  take the lowest possible  values, which are the
values that maximize  profit, i.e. from equation (6):
wo = vo + b +  (1-  r)y 2B  BO  = B . (lat")
The cutoff productivity  A; has to change  accordingly.  Substituting  wo  of (la")  in equation  (16) yields:
X; =  v, +  b - M . (19')
The expressions for (w,, B,), (w 2, B2), X7,  7o, ,,  i  2,  So, and S, all stay as in sections (2)-(4), even
though the numerical  solution is, of course, different. Taking the total derivative  with respect to B we
obtain:
dAX  (v 1 -vO)  T  (1-T)  [(1-T)  a  (wo)  72  6  Ta  (XA) ]  O
[  (1-E)  (-P  (1  -T)  )  +#B8O  (  1-T)  ]2+  (V,-VO)  iGT  (1-T)2a  (wo)  a  (XA  ) B- 18 -
=  -a  (A;) 
dS 1 -T  dY2 >
dB  [1-  (1-T)  (1-Y2)  ]2  dB
The larger the exogenous  bond B is, the higher the unemployment  rate amnong  vt individuals, St.
This rise in St takes place as long as B < B  = nin  ("B)  =  (vI-vo)/[1-(1-  t 2 )(1-T)J,  as presented
by the curve "acd" in figure 3. Points a and c represent  the unemployment  levels corresponding  to the
unconstrained case  of  our  model, and  to  the constrained model of  Albrecht and  Axell (1984),
respectively.  As long as B  <  B', there are firms with productivity  X which is larger or equal to wo  in
equation  (la")  and smaller than  01  (which is w, in (lb) for 72  =  ? 2 ), that can make  positive profit
offering (wo,  BO)  contract, but lose money offering  an  (1,  B,)  contract. Therefore, as long as B <
B*  there will be some wo  firms with productivity  X distributed  on the range (wo(B),  ?Q). When B >  B'
the economy  will consist  of firms offering  lifetime  contracts  (0,  B)  and (w 2, B2)  only. Any marginal
increase in B above B' does not change the unemployment  rate further.
Studying the effect of the exogenous  bond B on the unemployment  rate SO  of vo individuals  we
obtain:
dSo  T  dp
dTB-  1(i  Tp]  I  dB- 19  -
dp =a  (wO) (1-T)  2-a(,')B  dX;]
72 +  Ta  (A)
a (wO)  T1-)y-  2 (1-T)  a(w0 )T 
1 +  (1-0.)  (1-p  (1-T)  )  + 6-Yt  (1-T)  ]2
(VI-vo)  3T ( 1-)
2 a  (wo)  a  (XA) B
Hence, the convergence  of SO  from the unrestricted  level corresponding  to B = 0 to the higher level
of the constrained  model of Eckstein and Wolpin, is not necessarily  monotonic.
The intuition  behind the eventual  reduction in unemployment  as the separation bond decreases is
as follows. Restrictions on separation  or search on-the-job,  whether institutional,  moral or other, as in
Albrecht and Axell (1984) and Eckstein and Wolpin (1990), force firms to pay for the lost option to
search. However, this represents  an unexploited  profit opportunity. Firms whose productivity  is lower
than the wage w, that includes the option value, but higher than the leisure reservation wage wo, can
make positive profits by offering a lower wage than wl, but also freedom to continue  the search. Thus,
when the restrictions on search are relaxed, more firms with short-term labor contracts will be able to
compete in the market place. This tends to lower unemployment  among the vo  individuals  who are less
selective in terms of job acceptances.- 20 -
Although  none of the v, individuals  will accept  a job within  the wo  firms which became  active when
the restrictions on search were lifted, these new firms reduce unemployment  also among the v, workers
indirectly, via the general equilibrium  mechanism.  Workers in wo  firms search for w2 jobs, with higher
lifetime  utility, rather than w, firms, which do not raise their utility. The transition of workers from wo
to w 2 firms raise the labor supply of vo individuals  to w2 firms relative to w, firms. Hence, w, firms
which with the restricted search were marginally better off paying w, rather than w 2, would be willing
to pay the higher wage w2, realizing that with unrestricted  search the gain in labor supply of paying  the
higher  wage is larger. Since there are more firms that can pay the reservation  wage of the v, individuals,
the unemployment  among them falls. Notice that the increase in -Y2  with unrestricted  search drives the
wage w, up, dw,/dy 2 > 0. In order to induce  individuals  to take the w,  job when the probability  of a w2
job is higher, the wage premnium  in w, should be larger. The increase in w,, when the wage w 2 does not
change, contributes  also to the switch of the marginal  w, firms to the w 2 category. Again, unemployment
among v 1 individuals  falls with search  on-the-job  of the vo  individuals.
6.2.  Exogenous  Bond Goes to the Employer
Suppose now that a separation bond B,, going to the employer when forfeited, is exogenously
imposed. As long as the bond B is smaller than (v1-vo)/(l - (I-y2)(1-r)), where 72 is the ratio of firms
offering  w2 wage in the unconstrained  equilibrium,  the imposition  of P.  does not change  the equilibrium,
as implied  by section 5 in the context of endogenous  bonds. The terms of the labor contracts are:
wo  =vO  +b + ( 1 -T  )  72BO  - - 2  T )  > 0 Bo  a B  (la'
w2 = v, + b  B2 B  (ic"'))- 21  -
while (w,, B,) is a given by equation (lb).
The unemployment  rate is therefore constant  at levels SO  and S, for exogenous  bond B, 0 S  B <
(vl - vo)/(1  -(1-y2 )(1-r)). Similarly,  the unemployment  rate is constant  at levels  §0  >  SO  and  §,  >
SI when B satisfies B  2  (v, - vo)/(l - (1-  12  )(1-r)),  as shown by  "abcd" in figure 3.
When the exogenous  bond satisfies:
B e  vI  -v  vI  -vO
BE  - (1-WY 2 )  (1-  T)  1-  (-:  1-T 
the equilibrium is not well defined. To understand why this is the case, consider a bond B, =  (v, -
vO)/[1-(l-y 2)(1-T)]. In this case the contract (wo,  BO)  is identica!  to the (w,, B,) contract. Employees  of
the (wo,  BO)  firms will therefore not quit, which implies  that (wo,  BO)  firms will either cease being active
or offer the (w,, B,) lifetime  contract. The resulting  equilibrium  is the one of Eckstein and Wolpin  (1990)
with all contracts  in the economy  as lifetime  contracts, and when the ratio of w 2 firms is  2 <  72  and
with  (,1  I  l)  contract which satisfies  Qt  <  w,,  B1  >  B,. But once this happens, there is an
incentive  for all firms previously  offering the (wo,  BO)  contract, to offer a contract (wo(B),  B) where B,
<  B <  Al  . In this case (wo(B),  B) employees  do quit when they are offered a w2 wage and the firm
collects the bond B. This policy maximizes  profit for all firms which offered  (wo,  BO)  previously,  since
it yields the same profit as earlier. But if all these firms offer thle  (wo(B),  B) contract, we are back in the
initial situation;  employees will not have the incentive  to quit ani firms will cease being active and so
on.
Thus, the number  of active  firms when the bond is constrained  to the region  between  Bt and  B' 
is not uniquely  determined.  Instead  there is a dynamics  of firms changing  their optimal  policy in response
to changing  market conditions.- 22 -
The reason underlying thi  phenomenon  here and not in the case where the bond goes to a third
party is as follows. In the latter case, raising  the bond ioiv:rs the profitability  of the (wo,  BO)  policy and
therefore gradually forces (wo,  BO)  firms out of the -Aarket;  firms with lowest productivity  ?s are the first
to exit. No such gradua' reduction  of profits happens  when  the firm collects  the forfeited  bond. Therefore
there is no clear distinction  of the nature of the firms who a.re  eventually  forced out.
We can now relate our work to the body of literature which deals with the separation of workers
and firms. The first issue is the possible existence  of a mechanism  which neutralizes  outside  intervention
in the nature of the labor contract. According  to Lazear (1990), mechanism  of this type exists when the
intervention  takes the form of a financial  transfer  between  the sides  of the contract,  whereas  Gavin (1986)
and Emerson (1988) do not consider this p ssibility. As we observe here, an offsetting mechanism  is
endogenously  evolved in a general equilibrium  model. The wage rises with the exogenous  bond B, as in
(la"'),  such that the effect of B on the economy  is completely  neutralized.
However, although  from the point of view of a single firm or worker this offsetting  mechanism  is
feasible for any bond B, general equilibrium  forces impose  an upper bound on the size of the bond B
which can be neutralized.  When the imposed  B exceeds  a certain value, the wage of the contract  (wo(Bo),
Bo = B) is so attractive  relative  to the best market alternative  (w 2, B 2), such that workers never quit. But
this implies that a (wo(BO),BO  = B) contract will not exist, since it is profitable  only when the worker
quits and the firm collects  the bond when he is offered a (w 2, B2)  contract.
We thus conclude that even in a general equilibrium  Lodel, there exists a range of values that the
separation  bonds  takes, without  having  any real effect on the economy.  This is the case when the forfeited
bond goes to the firm. However, when the bond is large enough, distortionary  effects occur.
When  the separation  bond goes to a third party, anv intervention  restricting  the mobility  of workers
between  jobs, reduces  employment.  In this case, unlike the previous  one, the imposition  of the exogenous
bond must reduce the combined welfare of the firm and its employees,  and therefore no arrangement
between them can neutralize the effects of the bond. When the bond rises, unemployment  increases  up4.  &
- 23 -
to the level in which workers' mobility  is completely  restricted, i.e. the level obtained by Albrecht  and
Axell (1984) and Eckstein and Wolpin (1990). At this point, the effect of an additional increase in the
size of the bond on the employment  level is null.
7.  UNEMPLOYMENT  COMPENSATION
The effect of a rise in unemployment  compensation  on employment  can be summarized  as follows:
PROPOSITION  3: When unemployment  compensation  rises, employment  among v 0 individuals  falls; a
sufficient condition for a decrease in employment  of v, individuals  is a'(X) s  0, i.e., nonincreasing
density of firm-specific  productivities.
PROOF:
dSo  T  dp
Since p  =  A(wo)  and w 0 =  v0 +  b, then dwo/db  =  1 and dp/db =  a(wo) a  0, the density of the
productivity  index at the point w0. Thus the unemployment  rate So  among  v0 individuals  rises as a result
of the decrease in the number  of active  firms. The effect of a higher b on v, employment  is given by the
following  equations:
dS 1 T  d7 2
- [1-(1-T)  (3-y 2 )  22  dF-24  -
d-Y 2 -a  (;)  dX
d-1  (v  -vo)  {P,T  (1-,Pi  (1-T)  a (w0 ) -0  (1-T)  [a  (X')  -a  (w 0 )]  )}
db  (3'y 0 (1-T)  +  (1-3)  (1-p  (1-T)  I  )2
This is positive when a'(X) s  0 which ensures that aQ0) s  a(w 0). Only when a(X;) = a(w 2) is much
larger than a(w 0), then dX,/db can be negative which makes ds,/db negative; i.e.,  a decrease in the
unemployment  among v, individuals  when the unemployment  compensation  b rises. We thus conclude
that a higher b increases  unemployment  among  v0 workers always, and increases  unemployment  among
v, workers in most cases. To understand  how the reversed result might arise, notice that the change in
the proportion y 0 of w 0 fums is:
dy0 y  dX-a  dwo =a(X')  -a(wo)
When  this number  happens  to be very large there will be a large increase  in the number  of w 0 firms. This
is good news for w 2 firms, since the labor supply f(w2)  to these firms rises when more workers
eventually move from w0 to w 2 firms. This can increase the number of w2 firms, and reduces S,, since
the mobility of workers adds to the profitability of the w2 firms. Again, there is a positive contribution
to the employment  of v, workers as a result of the mobility  of their v 0 colleagues.
Suppose  now that the increase in unemployment  compensation  is selective, and given only to v 0
individual-. The comparative  statics of this exercise  can be summarized  as:- 25  -
dp  =a  (w0)  >0
d  A;_  -_  __T_  _  _-  a  (WO)  (V 1 - VO)  (1-T)  ]
db  Y0  (1-T)  +  (-)  1-P  (1  T)  ]  l  'y  ,{(1T)  +  (1-B  [1-p  (1T-T)]J
Once again,  we  get  an  unambiguous fall  in  v 0 employment when  the  selective unemployment
compensation  increases. This is in contrast  with the result  obtained  by Eckstein  and Wolpin  (1990) where
the  unemployment rate  §0 does  not  necessarily rise  with  a  (general or  selective) increase in
unemployment  compensation.  The first term in dX,/db is negative, and therefore represents  a rise in the
proportion y2  of w2 firms and a decrease in the unemployment  rate SI among v, workers. This term
appears  also in Albrecht  and Axell  (1984), and it arises since w 2 does not change while w, increases  with
a selective rise in b, and therefore it is relatively more profitable to be a w 2 firm. The other term in
dX7/db  represents  a rise in p and a fall in yo  (dyo/db  = -a(w 0)) when b increases  selectively.  This lowers
the labor supply and profits of w 2 firms, and therefore increases unemployment  among v, individuals.
The net effect on S, can therefore be positive  or negative, depending  on the parameters' values.! Note
that as long as the bond is determined  endogenously,  the analysis  of the effect of a rise in unemployment
compensation  on unemployment  remains  the same regardless  of whether the bond, when forfeited, goes
to the employer or to a third party.
7 It is interesting  to note that although  our model extends the works of Albrecht  and Axell (1984) and
Eckstein  and Wolpin  (1990), the comparative  statics  in their models  is much  more tedious  than here. For
example,  the unemployment  rate among  v0 individuals  in Eckstein  and Wolpin, S 0, depends  positively  on
p=  A(w,), and not on p =  A(wo)  as in our model.  Since w,,  unlike w0, depends also on the endogenous
variable  72,  the derivative of p with respect to b is quite complicated.- 26 -
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